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Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a new method to directly test the existence of adverse 
selection in the automobile insurance market. By tracing the renewal decisions of the 
insured, we find that, in Taiwan automobile insurance market, the choice of insurance 
coverage and the previous-year claim records are positive ly correlated, which can be a 
result of adverse selection but not of moral hazard. We further find that the loss ratio is 
positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage. This indicates that 
cross-subsidization may exist in the market. The finding of cross-subsidization further 
strengthens the evidence to support the existence of adverse selection. 
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1. Introduction 
Asymmetric information has been widely discussed in the insurance literature 
since Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Shavell (1979) first pioneered this line of 
research. Following their footsteps, many researchers (e.g., Stiglitz, 1977; Wilson, 1977; 
Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978; Dionne and Lesserre, 1985, 1987; and Arnott and 
Stiglitz, 1988) have provided insightful theoretical analysis on the market with 
asymmetric information problems. More recently, several papers have used empirical 
data to further examine the theoretical predictions on asymmetric information in real 
world. 
However, the empirical evidence in the literature has not yet reached a determinant 
conclusion on whether asymmetric information problems do exist in the insurance 
market. Some researches (e.g., Puelz and Snow, 1994; Dionne and Gagne, 2002; and 
Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004) have found evidence to support the existence of 
asymmetric information in insurance markets, whereas other researches (e.g., Chiappori 
and Salanie, 1997, 2000; Cawley and Philipson, 1999; Cardon and Hendel, 2001; 
Dionne, Gourieroux, and Vanasse, 2001) have found no such evidence. 
It is important to find out the existence of asymmetric information in reality. It is 
also essential to further identify its source, if asymmetric information exists. Two types 
of asymmetric information problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, specifically 
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received a lot of attention in the insurance literature. Each of these problems has a 
different impact on insurance operation and should be remedied by a different solution. 
Therefore, it is important for insurers to further identify the source of the asymmetric 
information. 
However, it is not an easy task to separate adverse selection from moral hazard. 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) alleged that both adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems would cause the choice of coverage and the occurrence of the claim to be 
positively correlated. Thus, they examined the existence of asymmetric information by 
testing the conditional dependence between the choice of coverage and the occurrence 
of the claim. Unfortunately, under their approach, we cannot further identify whether 
asymmetric information is caused by the adverse selection or by moral hazard problem, 
because both adverse selection and moral hazard problems would cause the same result. 
Among those researchers who found evidence to support the existence of 
asymmetric information, only a few have identified its source. Dionne and Gagne (2002) 
separated moral hazard from adverse selection by analyzing the effect of the 
replacement cost endorsement. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) used data in the annuity 
market to provide a direct test for adverse selection under the assumption that moral 
hazard problems are limited in that market. Chiappori and Heckman (2000) and 
Abbring, Heckman, Chiappori and Piquet (2003) proposed employing dynamic data to 
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verify the moral hazard problem. By adopting dynamic data, Abbring, Heckman, 
Chiappori and Piquet (2003) did not find strong evidence of moral hazard in France’s 
automobile insurance market. 
This paper intends to propose a new approach to directly trace adverse selection by 
using the insured’s renewal decisions. We first use previous-year claim records as a 
proxy to classify the insured’s risk type. We then examine whether the previous-year 
claim records are related to the choice of insurance coverage in the following year. 
Since the previous-year claims happened prior to the insured choosing their insurance 
coverage, only adverse selection, as argued by Abbring, Heckman, Chiappori and 
Piquet (2003), can explain the relationship between the previous-year claim records and 
the insurance coverage choices. Therefore, we can examine the existence of adverse 
selection by testing the correlation between the choice of insurance coverage and the 
previous-year claim records for the continuing renewal contracts.1 
Furthermore, we intend to test whether cross-subsidization exists in the market. 
Unlike most papers in the literature generating their empirical hypotheses by Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976), we test whether the market equilibrium is separating equilibrium 
with cross-subsidization as proposed by Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978).2 It should 
                                                 
1 This argument rests on the assumption that an individual’s risk preference does not change because of 
an accident. If the individual becomes more risk averse after experiencing an accident, he/she will choose 
a policy with higher coverage in the renewal decision, no matter which risk type the insured belongs to. 
2 Only a few of the researches support cross-subsidization. By analyzing the U.S. crop insurance market, 
Makki and Somwaru (2001) find that high risks are under charged whereas low risks are over charged. 
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be noted that both Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and cross-subsidization equilibrium 
proposed by Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) predict separating equilibrium, that 
high risks choose high coverage and low risks choose low coverage. On the other hand, 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) predict that both high risks and low risks are charged on 
basis of their own loss probabilities, whereas cross-subsidization equilibrium proposed 
by Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978) predict that high risks receive subsidization 
from low risks. 
To provide evidence for the cross-subsidization hypothesis,3 we further test 
whether the loss ratio is related to the choice of coverage. When facing the adverse 
selection problem described by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), an insurer could design 
break-even policies with different ranges of coverage in a competitive insurance market. 
The insured would then self-select insurance policies according to their own risk types. 
The high-risk insured will choose high coverage and be charged a high premium rate, 
while the low-risk insured will choose low coverage and be charged a low premium rate. 
Thus, in Rothschild and Stiglitz’s separating equilibrium, the expected loss ratio is not 
related to the choice of insurance coverage, as shown in appendix A. On the other hand, 
the loss ratio could be positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage if the re 
is a cross-subsidization in the market, as shown in Appendix B. It is important to note 
                                                 
3 According to Crocker and Snow (1985), the consumers’ welfare can be improved if cross-subsidization 
is allowed in the insurance market with adverse selection.  
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that the loss ratio could be unrelated to the choice of insurance coverage if only a moral 
hazard problem exists in the market, as shown in Appendix C. Thus, we may use 
cross-subsidization evidence to further separate adverse selection from moral hazard. 
Our empirical results find strong evidence to support that asymmetric information 
problems do exist in Taiwan’s market. Second, we find a positive relationship between 
the choice of insurance coverage and the previous-year claim records, which indicates 
the existence of adverse selection. Furthermore, we find that the loss ratio is 
significantly positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage, which indicates 
the existence of cross-subsidization. Thus, our empirical results support that adverse 
selection problems exist in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market and the market 
equilibrium is a separating equilibrium with cross-subsidization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 introduce the automobile 
insurance in Taiwan and explain why contracts with different features could screen 
individuals. Section 3 describes the data and the summary statistics. Section 4 provides 
evidence for asymmetric information. Section 5 confirms that adverse selection exists in 
Taiwan automobile insurance market. Section 6 further demonstrates the evidence of 
cross-subsidization. Section 7 concludes and suggests some further extension. 
 
2. Automobile insurance in Taiwan and the contract screening 
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In 2003, approximately 5.6 million car owners purchased automobile insurance 
from 25 insurance companies in Taiwan. Automobile insurance accounts for about 50 
percent of the insurance premium volume in most property- liability insurance 
companies and has occupied the largest market share of the property- liability insurance 
market.  
Three types of automobile insurance have been observed in the market: 
compulsory liability,  supplementary liability, and comprehensive coverage for damage. 
Compulsory liability covers only the injuries to a third party, no matter if the insured is 
responsible. Supplementary liability, which is purchased voluntarily, covers both 
property damage and bodily injury.  Comprehensive coverage, which is also purchased 
voluntarily, provides coverage for property damage to the driver's automobile. In 2003, 
the total premiums paid for comprehensive coverage insurance were about US$0.37 
billion and the incurred losses were about US$0.23 billion. 
There are three types of contracts in comprehensive coverage insurance: Type A, B 
and C. Type A coverage covers all risks, including all kinds of collision and 
non-collision losses, which may be caused by missiles or falling objects, fire, explosion, 
windstorm, intentional body damage, malicious mischief, and any unidentified reasons 
other than the exclusions in the policy.  Type B coverage selected risks. It also covers 
collision and non-collision losses as Type A does. However, the non-collision losses 
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caused by intentional body damage, malicious mischief, and the unidentified reasons 
covered under type A are specifically excluded from type B. Type C covers only 
damage in a collision involving two or more vehicles. Collision losses caused by hitting 
other objects— such as a telephone pole, a tree, or a building— and non-collision losses 
that used to be covered under types A and B are specifically excluded from type C.  
To examine the asymmetric information problems in Taiwan’s automobile 
insurance market, we focus on comprehensive coverage insurance. Most of the 
empirical papers examine asymmetric information problem in insurance market by 
limiting their focus to whether individuals purchase greater payment exhibit higher risk. 
From a different angle to provide evidence of asymmetric information, Finkelstain and 
Poterba’s (2004) paper indicates that insurance contracts with different features could 
screen individuals directly. For example, an individual with a higher life expectation 
will purchase back- loaded annuity, which has a higher payment in later periods than an 
annuity with flate payment. An individual with a lower life expectation will demand an 
annuity with guarantee period. Following their paper, we argue that different risk types 
of individuals will self-select among the three types of comprehensive coverage 
insurance.  
In the present of adverse selection, there will be two types of individuals: high risk 
type and low risk type. In automobile insurance, a high risk driver has a higher 
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probability causing a car accident, no matter the accident involves other vehicles. Thus, 
type A and B contracts could be referred as “high coverage” contracts, and type C could 
be referred as a “low coverage” contract. Therefore, in the present of adverse selection, 
high risk individuals will purchase type A or B contracts and have a higher probability 
to file a claim, where as low risk individuals will purchase type C contract and have a 
lower probability to file a claim.  
However, types A and B cover more risks than type C and obviously could have 
more claims. To control the effect caused by the broader coverage of types A and B, we 
use only claim data of collision losses with more than two cars involved,4 since 
non-collision losses covered under types A and B are specifically excluded from type C. 
It is worth noting that the above prediction is also observable in the present of 
moral hazard. When a market suffers moral hazard problem, the individuals covered by 
higher coverage will be less careful. Thus, if an individual purchase type A or B, he or 
she will drive less carefully because that the contract covers any damage that caused by 
any identified reason. Meanwhile, a driver becomes more careless will simultaneously 
increase both the probability of hitting another vehicle and other objects. Therefore, we 
predict that the individuals with type A or B contracts will have a higher probability to 
file collision losses with more than two cars involved.  
                                                 
4 Although types A, B, and C all cover collision losses with more than two cars involved, the 
policyholders of types A and B are more likely to be high risk drivers and could more likely cause 
collision losses with more than two cars involved.  
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3. Data and summary statistics 
Our data come from a large insurance company that controls over 30 percent of the 
market share in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. Thus, we believe that the data 
should be representative for the entire automobile insurance market in Taiwan. In total, 
we assemble 185,704 observations, which can be distributed as 59,186, 61,627, and 
64,891 observations in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. 5 The dataset also includes 
information about age, gender, and marriage status for the insured’s characters and age 
of car, brand, and registered location for the car’s characters. The definitions of all the 
variables are displayed in Tables D1 in Appendix D. The summary statistics of  all the 
variables for the whole sample are displayed in Table D2 in Appendix D.  
To track the existence of adverse selection, we further use a sub-sample in which 
the insured purchased insurance in year t  and renewed the policy in year 1+t . In the 
sub-sample, there are 26,420, 28,986, and 31,305 observations in 1999, 2000, and 2001, 
respectively.  The summary statistics of the renewal decision and all the other variables 
for the sub-sample are displayed in Table D3 in Appendix D. 
To track cross-subsidization, we investigate whether the loss ratio of the individual 
who purchases types A and B is larger than that of the individual who purchases type C. 
The loss ratio of the individual is defined as the amount of the claim the individual files 
                                                 
5 We start from year 1999, because that type C is launched from that year.  
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divided by the amount of the insurance premium the individual pays. The summary 
statistics of the loss ratio )(LR  for the whole sample and for the renewal sample are 
respectively displayed in Tables D2 and D3 in Appendix D.  
 
4. Evidence for asymmetric information 
Our empirical analysis begins by testing the existence of asymmetric information 
in Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. We follow the empirical model suggested by 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000), which used a pair of probit models to test the conditional 
dependence between the choice of coverage and the occurrence of the claim. The probit 
models are as the follows: 
)()1(Prob aii Xy bF== , and         (1) 
)()1(Prob bii Xz bF==  ,         (2) 
where iX  is the variable for individual i ’s information, ab  and bb  are the 
coefficient vectors of the regressor, and F  is the cumulative distribution function of 
)1,0(N . iy  is a dummy variable that indicates individual i  chooses high-coverage 
policies. Since both types A and B cover non-collision claims and type C covers only 
collision claims, we classify types A and B as high coverage and type C as low coverage. 
Thus, when an individual i  chooses comprehensive automobile insurance coverage of 
type A or B, then 1=iy ; otherwise 0=iy . iz  is another dummy variable that marks 
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a claim. In this paper we do not use all the claims when defining the variable iz . 
Instead, we employ only those claims that involve a collision with at least two cars. To 
avoid a potential bias caused by unobservable accidents in type C, we employ the same 
criteria to identify a claim for all policies, i.e., 1=iz  when an individual i  files a 
claim caused by a collision with at least two cars; otherwise 0=iz . 
The estimated residuals of the above two probits can be calculated as follows: 
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where f  is the density distribution function of )1,0(N , respectively. 
To test the conditional dependent of ieˆ  and ihˆ , we follow Chiappori and Salanie 
(2000) and use a test statistic W 6: 
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W  is distributed asymptotically as a )1(2c . We test its significance under the null 
hypothesis of 0),cov( =ii he . If there is asymmetric information, the conditional 
dependence between the choice of coverage and the occurrence of the claim should be 
significantly positive. 
                                                 
6 In Chiappori and Salanie (2000) empirical dataset, the difference of the length of the policies comes 
from the mismatch of year and calendar year, so the W -statistic in their research needs a weight. 
Because our data are calculated on a calendar year basis, our W -statistic does  not need the weight 
factor. 
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Using the whole sample, we report the conditional correlations between coverage 
and claim for each year in Table 1. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the 
correlation coefficients ( r ) between ie  and ih  in this table are all positive. 
Furthermore, the statistics (W ) show that the correlations between the choice of 
coverage and the occurrence of a claim are significantly different from zero. Thus, the 
empirical evidence implies that asymmetric information problems do exist in Taiwan’s 
automobile insurance market. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
It should be noted that many of the claims are generated by new cars and many 
new cars’ owners who purchased the comprehensive insurance do not renew the ir 
policies for the following year. The means of z  (the average claim frequency) for the 
sub-sample are 9.94%, 11.55%, and 4.65% in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. 
However, the means of z  for the entire sample are 27.44%, 31.01%, and 32.41% in 
1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. On the other hand, the means of 0carage  (the 
proportion of new cars) for the sub-sample are 1.25%, 1.04%, and 0.83% in 1999, 2000, 
and 2001, respectively, whereas, the means of 0carage  for the entire sample are 
43.03%, 39.06%, and 31.24% in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively.  It is generally 
believed in the insurance industry that new cars could contribute most of the 
asymmetric information problems. By comparing the empirical results from the entire 
 14 
sample and the sub-sample, we are able to further analyze whether the asymmetric 
information problems prevail in the market, no matter which policies result from new 
cars. 
In Table 2, we perform Chiappori and Salanie’s test by using the sub-sample data 
for the insured who continue to renew their policies in the following year. Consistent 
with the results in Table 1, all of the correlation coefficients ( r ) in Table 2 are still 
positive. The result once again confirms the existence of asymmetric information in the 
sub-sample group of the continuing renewal insured. However, we find all of the 
correlation coefficients ( r ) in Table 2 are respectively smaller than those in Table 1.  
It should be noted that the sub-sample consists of fewer new cars, whereas the entire 
sample includes many new cars. Thus, combing the results of Tales 1 and 2, our 
empirical evidence indicates that the insurance markets for both new cars and old cars 
could suffer from asymmetric information problems, although the insurance market for 
new cars could suffer more severe problems.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Evidence for adverse selection 
In this section, we directly track the existence of adverse selection. We use a 
sub-sample where the insured purchased insurance in year 1-t  and renewed their 
policy in the following year t . In year t , the insurer could observe whether the 
 15 
individuals file a claim in the previous year 1-t . Thus, this record could be indicated 
as a proxy of individual’s risk type. The individual’s contract choice at year t  will be 
affected by all of the observable variables at year t  and his or her risk type. To test 
whether a high risk type will choose high coverage, we use a probit model as the 
follows: 
)()1(Prob 1-+F== itdcitit zXy bb ,        (6) 
where ity  is as defined in the previous section, itX  is the variable for individual i ’s 
information at year t , and cb  and db  are the coefficient vectors of the regressor. 
When individual i  files a claim caused by a collision with at least two cars in year 
1-t , then 11 =-itz ; otherwise 01 =-itz .  
In Equation (6), 1-itz  is now as a proxy of individual’s risk type. It does not mean 
that the individual’s risk type is observable at year t . The insurer could only conclude 
that the insured has a high probability of being a high risk type when the insured files a 
claim at year 1-t . If the sample of 11 =-itz  contains more high risk drivers, then the 
theory of adverse selection would predict a positive db . However, it is very important 
to recognize that there exists another force which could drive db  being negative: 
experience rating. If the insured files a claim at year 1-t , then he or she will face an 
increase of premium for all choice of contracts at year t . A high coverage contract 
would become less affordable to the insured who ever filed a claim in the previous year. 
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Thus, the effect of experience rating would lead the insured with previous claim records 
to choose a contract with less coverage at year t . Therefore, db  would be negative. 
 In Table 3, we report the estimator between the choice of the renewal decision and 
the previous-year claim records. We find all the coefficients are significantly positive. 
This result confirms that a high risk type insured will choose high coverage contract. 
Our result support that the effect of experience rating is dominated by adverse selection. 
Combining the findings in Tables 2 and 3, our empirical results provide evidence to 
support that adverse selection contributes to asymmetric information problems in 
Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
It should be noted that the evidence from Tables 1 and 2 supports the existence of 
asymmetric information problem in the insurance market, where evidence from Table 3 
indicates that asymmetric information problems could be caused by adverse selection. 
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of the existence of moral hazard, since it is 
possible that both adverse selection and moral hazard might co-exist in the market. 
 
6. Evidence for cross-subsidization 
Finally, to track the existence of cross-subsidization, we construct a Tobit 
regression as follows: 
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iifeii yXLR ubb ++= ,        (7) 
where iLR  is the total claim amount divided by the premium for each individual. iX  
and iy  are as defined above. It is important to recognize that iLR  has a mass on zero 
since most individuals do not file a claim. Thus, we use a Tobit regression to estimate 
the parameters in Equation (7). According to our model in Appendix B, we predict that 
fb , the coefficient of iy  in Equation (7), should be significantly positive if 
cross-subsidization exists. 
In Table 4, be using the renewal sample, we report fb  in the Tobit regression. If 
there is adverse selection but no cross-subsidization in the market, the choice of policy 
should not correlate to the loss ratio as shown in Appendix A. From Table 4, we find 
that all the coefficients are significantly positive, which implies that the insured who 
buy high coverage policies tend to have high loss ratios. The evidence from Tables 3 
and 4 together imply that the insurance market may exist both adverse selection and 
cross-subsidization. Moreover, since moral hazard can not make individual’s choice of 
the policy and the individual’s loss ratio correlated as shown by Appendix C, evidence 
from Table 4 could further support the existence of adverse selection. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  
7. Conclusion 
Identifying the source of asymmetric information is an important issue in the 
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insurance literature. Previous studies have separated moral hazard from adverse 
selection by using either dynamic data (Chiappori and Heckman, 2000) or the 
particularity of a sample set (Dionne and Gagne, 2002; and Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2004). In this paper, we propose a new method to directly examine the existence of 
adverse selection. Using three-year individual data from a large insurance company in 
Taiwan, this paper analyzes whether adverse selection exists in the insurance market. 
We use renewal decisions to track adverse selection problems. By adopting claim 
records as a proxy of the insured’s risk type, we allege that only adverse selection, not 
moral hazard, can explain the relationship between the previous-year claims and the 
choice of coverage in the following year. We further argue that the individual’s loss 
ratio will be posit ively correlated to individual’s choice of coverage if there exist both 
adverse selection and cross-subsidization in the market. 
Applying the same approach as Chiappori and Salanie (2000), our empirical 
evidence confirms that asymmetric information problems do exis t in Taiwan’s 
comprehensive automobile insurance market. Furthermore, our results make a new 
contribution to the insurance literature by further directly tracking the existence of 
adverse selection. Our empirical evidence shows that the correlation between the choice 
of insurance coverage and the previous-year claim records is significantly positive, and 
the loss ratio is also significantly positively correlated to the choice of coverage. Thus, 
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we conclude that adverse selection exists in Taiwan’s comprehensive automobile 
insurance market. 
It should be also noted that our findings actually do not refute but rather 
supplement those papers that found no evidence to support the existence of asymmetric 
information. First, we employ data from comprehensive automobile insurance, which 
was not yet used to examine asymmetric information problems in the literature. Second, 
we use data in the early stage of the developing insurance market, while most of the 
data used in the literature has come from a well-developed market. It is possible that 
asymmetric information exists in the early stage of the insurance market, as described 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However, over the years, insurance companies collect 
more and more information to screen the insured and eventually eliminate asymmetric 
information problems in the market. Thus, our findings suggest that further 
investigation of asymmetric information problems by comparing different insurance 
markets or data from different countries is definitely needed. 
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Table 1   The Conditional Correlation Between Coverage and 
Claim in Comprehensive Automobile  Insurance in Years 1999 to 2001 
Year r  W  
1999 0.2845*** 24.3063*** 
2000 0.3863*** 294.970*** 
2001 0.4506*** 1743.49*** 
        Note: The significant level of 99% is denoted by *** 
 
Table 2  The Conditional Correlation Between Coverage and 
Claim in the Same Year (Sub-sample of Continued Insured) 
Year r  W  
1999 0.2217*** 295.973*** 
2000 0.3330*** 10.1900*** 
2001 0.2880*** 75.5288*** 
         Note: The significant level of 99% is denoted by *** 
 
Table 3  The relationship Between Coverage and 
previous Claim records (Sub-sample of Continued Insured) 
Year db  
1999 0.8507*** 
2000 1.0275*** 
2001 0.8892*** 
         Note: The significant level of 99% is denoted by *** 
 
Table 4   The Coefficient of Risk Type for Loss Ratio in Tobit Regression  
Year 
fb  
1999 1.7613*** 
2000 1.8566*** 
2001 2.0730*** 
Note: The significant level of 99% is denoted by *** 
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Appendix A 
Assume that individuals face a binominal property risk with either a fixed loss 
with a probability ip  or no loss with ip-1 , where i  denotes risk types in the 
economy, },{ lhi Î  and 01 >>> lh pp . Let the fraction of h  risk type agents isq .  
The types are the insured’s private information and are unobservable to the insurer. For 
the sake of simplicity, assume all individuals have the same initial wealthw , loss 
amount L , and utility function U  with 0>¢U  and 0£¢¢U . 
On the basis of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) separating equilibrium, a 
risk-neutral insurer with a cost loading l  in a competitive insurance market will offer 
two contracts to the market, and each contract in the equilibrium set makes zero profit. 
Points B  and G  in Figure A1 denote the optimal contracts for high and low-risk type 
individuals, respectively. A high-risk type insured is indifferent about choosing points 
B  or G , whereas a low-risk type insured prefers point G .   
Zero profit contracts in the equilibrium suggest that point B  contains high 
coverage hQ  for a high insurance premium hhQpl)1( + , and point G  contains low 
coverage lQ  for a low insurance premium llQpl)1( + . Let E  denote the 
expectation operator. Thus, the expected value of loss ratio iLR  for the i  type 
insured will become 
lpl
p
+
=
+
=
1
1
)1(
)(
ii
ii
i Q
Q
LRE , which is independent of risk type 
i . 
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Figure A1 Separating Equilibrium 
w Wealth in the no- loss 
state 
Wealth in  
the loss 
state 
w-L 
0 
450 
hp  
lp  
lU  
hU  
G  B  
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Appendix B 
Based upon the model setting in Appendix A, we now consider Miyazaki’s (1977) 
separating equilibrium with cross-subsidization. As proposed by Puelz and Snow (1994), 
under cross-subsidization, the insurance premium for the i  type insured, },{ lhi Î , 
would be  
[ ]iiii kQP ++= pl)1( ,           (B1) 
where ik  is a charge for cross-subsidization among contracts. Since the insurance 
market is under perfect competition, the insurer will earn zero expected profit, which 
implies that cross-subsidization across risk types will net out to zero, i.e., 0=å
i
iikw , 
where iw  denotes the proposition of the insured with risk type i . In Miyazaki’s model, 
the insurer will earn profit on policies purchased by low risk type insured but incur 
losses on those purchased by high risk type insured. In other words, lh kk << 0 . 
Therefore, the expected loss ratio of high risk types will be greater than that of low risk 
types, since 
[ ] [ ]
[ ][ ]
.0
)1()1(
)()(
>
++
-
=
++
-
++
=
-
hhhhhh
hlllhh
lll
ll
hhh
hh
lh
kQkQ
kQkQ
kQ
Q
kQ
Q
LRELRE
pp
pp
pl
p
pl
p
       (B2) 
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Appendix C 
In this appendix, we adopt Winter’s (2000) hidden action model of moral hazard to 
demonstrate that the expected loss ratio is uncorrelated to the insurance coverage. 
Assume that individuals face a binominal property risk with either a fixed loss L  or no 
loss. Individuals could employ self-protection with cost x  to reduce the loss 
probability.  )(xp  with 0)( <¢ xp  and 0)( >¢¢ xp . Although the self-protection 
behavior could not be observed by the insurer, the insurer could still estimate the 
probability of risk occurrence. Thus, the risk neutral insurer would offer only a 
coverage Q  for premium Qx)()1( pl+ , where l  denotes the insurance loading. The 
expected loss ratio LR --- 
lpl
p
+
=
+
=
1
1
)()1(
)(
)(
Qx
Qx
LRE --- will be independent of the 
insurance coverage. 
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Appendix D 
Table D1  Definitions of the Variables 
Variables       Definition 
y   a dummy variable equals 1 when an individual chooses a type A or B policy, otherwise equals 0 
k  a dummy variable equals 1 when an individual chooses a type A or B policy in the next year, 
otherwise equals 0 
z   a dummy variable equals 1 when an individual’s claim is caused by a collision and the claim 
amount is above the threshold amount, otherwise equals 0 
LR              loss ratio, equals loss amount divided by the premium 
carage0      a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is new, otherwise equals 0  
carage1       a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is one year, otherwise equals 0  
carage2       a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is two years, otherwise equals 0 
carage3        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is three years, otherwise equals 0 
carage4        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is four years, otherwise equals 0 
carage5        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is five years, otherwise equals 0 
carage6        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is six years, otherwise equals 0 
carage7        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is seven years, otherwise equals 0 
carage8        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is eight years, otherwise equals 0 
carage9        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is nine years, otherwise equals 0 
carage10       a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is ten years, otherwise equals 0 
carage11        a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the car is eleven years, otherwise equals 0 
sexf            a dummy variable equals 1 when the owner of the car is female, otherwise equals 0 
married         a dummy variable equals 1 when the owner of car is married 
city         a dummy variable equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in the city, otherwise equals 0 
arean          a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, otherwise equals 0 
areas          a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, otherwise equals 0 
areaeast        a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is registered in the east of Taiwan, otherwise equals 0 
catpcd_1        a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or long-term 
rental purposes, otherwise equals 0 
catpcd_2        a dummy variable equals 1 when the car is a small freight-truck and is for non-commercial 
purposes or for business use, otherwise equals 0 
tramak_i        i=n,f,h,t,c, dummy variable equals 1when the trademark of the car is the assigned brand, 
otherwise equals 0 
age2          a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the insured is between 30 and 25, otherwise equals 
0 
age3          a dummy variable equals 1when the age of the insured is between 60 and 30, otherwise equals 0 
age4          a dummy variable equals 1 when the age of the insured is above 60, otherwise equals 0 
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Table D2  Summary Statistics for All Sample 
year 1999 2000 2001 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
z  0.2744 0.4462 0.3101 0.4625 0.3241 0.4681 
y  0.5882 0.4922 0.6059 0.4887 0.5979 0.4903 
LR 0.3769 1.2220 0.3964 1.1784 0.4113 1.2741 
carage0 0.4303 0.4951 0.3906 0.4879 0.3124 0.4635 
carage1 0.2441 0.4295 0.2049 0.4036 0.2122 0.4088 
carage2 0.1431 0.3501 0.1595 0.3661 0.1446 0.3517 
carage3 0.0746 0.2628 0.1020 0.3026 0.1245 0.3301 
carage4 0.0486 0.2150 0.0605 0.2384 0.0804 0.2720 
carage5 0.0302 0.1711 0.0395 0.1948 0.0483 0.2144 
carage6 0.0157 0.1244 0.0231 0.1501 0.0321 0.1762 
carage7 0.0076 0.0868 0.0111 0.1047 0.0178 0.1323 
carage8 0.0029 0.0538 0.0054 0.0731 0.0081 0.0898 
carage9 0.0014 0.0370 0.0021 0.0455 0.0037 0.0611 
carage10 0.0008 0.0276 0.0008 0.0282 0.0016 0.0406 
carage11 0.0002 0.0123 0.0005 0.0228 0.0006 0.0242 
Sexf 0.6312 0.4825 0.6551 0.4753 0.6584 0.4742 
Marria 0.5531 0.4972 0.6582 0.4743 0.7763 0.4167 
City 0.5199 0.4996 0.5361 0.4987 0.5547 0.4970 
arean  0.4635 0.4987 0.4752 0.4994 0.4998 0.5000 
Areas 0.2737 0.4458 0.2695 0.4437 0.2508 0.4335 
areaeast  0.0338 0.1806 0.0342 0.1816 0.0331 0.1789 
catpcd_1 0.9717 0.1659 0.9744 0.1578 0.9777 0.1475 
catpcd_2 0.0249 0.1559 0.0225 0.1482 0.0198 0.1393 
Tramak_n 0.1478 0.3549 0.1277 0.3338 0.1346 0.3413 
Tramak_f 0.1412 0.3482 0.1331 0.3397 0.1157 0.3198 
Tramak_h 0.0817 0.2739 0.0902 0.2865 0.0873 0.2823 
Tramak_t 0.3379 0.4730 0.3741 0.4839 0.3637 0.4811 
Tramak_c 0.1159 0.3201 0.0890 0.2847 0.0827 0.2755 
age2 0.1156 0.3197 0.1007 0.3009 0.0863 0.2809 
age3 0.8254 0.3796 0.8684 0.3380 0.8602 0.3468 
age4 0.0202 0.1405 0.0175 0.1312 0.0258 0.1584 
       
Numbers of 
observations 
59186  61627  64891  
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Table D3  Summary Statistics for Renewal Sample 
year 1999 2000 2001 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
z  0.0994 0.2992 0.1155 0.3196 0.0465 0.2107 
y  0.5523 0.4973 0.5421 0.4982 0.5305 0.4991 
LR 0.4925 0.5000 0.4903 0.4999 0.4681 0.4990 
carage0 0.0125 0.1111 0.0104 0.1013 0.0083 0.0908 
carage1 0.2789 0.4485 0.2393 0.4266 0.2073 0.4054 
carage2 0.2738 0.4459 0.2193 0.4138 0.2103 0.4075 
carage3 0.1835 0.3871 0.2068 0.4050 0.1776 0.3822 
carage4 0.1073 0.3095 0.1370 0.3439 0.1623 0.3688 
carage5 0.0688 0.2531 0.0816 0.2738 0.1042 0.3055 
carage6 0.0404 0.1969 0.0533 0.2246 0.0601 0.2377 
carage7 0.0194 0.1379 0.0289 0.1675 0.0367 0.1881 
carage8 0.0093 0.0960 0.0133 0.1146 0.0199 0.1397 
carage9 0.0036 0.0599 0.0059 0.0768 0.0080 0.0890 
carage10 0.0013 0.0364 0.0023 0.0484 0.0035 0.0589 
carage11 0.0010 0.0320 0.0010 0.0311 0.0011 0.0334 
Sexf 0.6183 0.4858 0.6362 0.4811 0.6566 0.4748 
Marria 0.7472 0.4346 0.8318 0.3740 0.9281 0.2584 
City 0.5535 0.4971 0.5640 0.4959 0.5720 0.4948 
arean  0.4937 0.5000 0.5098 0.4999 0.5230 0.4995 
Areas 0.2481 0.4319 0.2402 0.4272 0.2383 0.4261 
areaeast  0.0338 0.1808 0.0310 0.1735 0.0292 0.1684 
catpcd_1 0.9755 0.1547 0.9782 0.1459 0.9808 0.1372 
catpcd_2 0.0210 0.1433 0.0185 0.1346 0.0165 0.1276 
Tramak_n 0.1536 0.3606 0.1424 0.3495 0.1479 0.3550 
Tramak_f 0.1214 0.3266 0.1118 0.3152 0.1045 0.3059 
Tramak_h 0.0834 0.2765 0.0883 0.2837 0.0856 0.2797 
Tramak_t 0.3250 0.4684 0.3446 0.4752 0.3462 0.4758 
Tramak_c 0.1055 0.3071 0.0925 0.2897 0.0872 0.2822 
age2 0.0800 0.2711 0.0627 0.2424 0.0569 0.2317 
age3 0.8917 0.3107 0.8811 0.3237 0.9106 0.2853 
age4 0.0215 0.1449 0.0331 0.1789 0.0285 0.1664 
       
Numbers of 
observations 
26420  28986  31305  
 
